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Paul Ricœur (1913–2005) was 
one of the most acclaimed thinkers 
of the twentieth century. He figured 
as a Christian philosopher, prisoner 
of war, an exceptionally prolific au­
thor. His intellectual and academ­
ic path comprised multitudinous 
research areas, namely existential­
ism, anthropology, phenomenology, 
philo sophical biblical and herme­
neutics, philosophy of religion, phi­
losophy of action, language, law, the 
political, narrative and critical the­
ories.1 Ricœur is widely recognized 
as one of the most significant con­
temporary voices in philosophy of 
morality and ethics. The following 
study attempts to tackle the pro­
blem atic of the demand of the Other 
in Ricouer’s philosophical herme­
neutics in the framework of his ethi­
cal theory.
 1 Cf. D. M. Kaplan, Reading Ricœur, Albany 2003, p. 1.
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In general, Ricœur’s idea of ethics ensues from his concept of the nar­
rative coherence of life and the notion of narrative identity. He explicates 
the call of the Other and the ethics of the relation between the self and 
the Other mostly in his seminal Oneself as Another. For Ricœur, it is the 
demand of the Other which determines the formation of ‘the self,’ and 
the self is molded in a life­ long process of experience and interpretation. 
The ethical question, which becomes central for Ricœur, is an achieve­
ment of selfhood. Essentially, selfhood is constituted by our genuine re­
sponse to the Other. The formation of our self, its worth, depends upon 
our ability to see ourselves as human beings being called to respond to 
the Other.2 Ricœur introduces a rigorous distinction in this respect: for 
him, the narrative coherence of one’s life bespeaks the worthiness of one­
self as a subject, and the loss of the coherence would mean a loss of one­
self as a commendable self.3 The major facets of the demand of the Other 
that Ricœur underscores in his philosophical hermeneutics are the self 
and call of the suffering Other, the self and the Other in the relationship 
of friendship, the self as a capable human being, the ‘good life’ viewed 
through the prism of the relationship between the self and the Other.
For further analysis of the demand of the Other, it is worthwhile to 
recur to Ricœur’s explication of the difference between ethics and mo­
rality. Ricœur explains clearly the distinction between the two notions, 
stressing their different etymology. The first is of Greek, the second of 
Latin origin; ethics means that “which is considered to be good” and 
morality – that “which imposes itself as obligatory.”4 Elaborating on the 
two terms, he uses ethics for “the aim of an accomplished life and the 
term morality for the articulation of this aim in norms characterized at 
once by the claim to universality and by an effect of constraint.”5 Ricœur 
views ethics as “the project of an accomplished life,” in its original version 
 2 Cf. P. Ricouer, The Narrative Path: The Later Works of Paul Ricœur, eds. D. Rasmussen, P. Kemp, 
Cambridge, MA 1989, p. 96–99.
 3 Cf. P. Ricouer, The Narrative Path…, op. cit., p. 99–103.
 4 P. Ricœur, Oneself as Another, transl. K. Blamey, Chicago 1992, p. 170.
 5 P. Ricœur, Oneself as Another, op. cit., p. 170.
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“la vise d’ une vie accompli.”6 Ethics is preoccupied with the question: 
“How should I live?,” whereas morality belongs to the realm of deontol­
ogy and is concerned with the query: “What must I do?”. Most impor­
tantly Ricœur prioritizes ethics over morals, praxis over principle. His 
preference follows more Aristotle’s concept of the good life, rather than 
the Kantian imperative which comes from the outside.
‘Self‑ Esteem’ as an Ethical Aim in Ricœur’s Hermeneutics
Following from his reflections upon the narrative coherence of one’s 
life, Ricœur’s is the view that our lives have an ethical aim. It is of crucial 
import to see the intersubjective character of a moral evaluation of our 
lives which Ricœur proposes. The ethical aim of our lives according to 
him is self­ esteem, and ‘self­ esteem’ means an ability to attest to oneself 
as a worthy subject, capable of a good life. Our capability is not only a vi­
able possibility, but rather also a true ethical aim of our lives.7 Ricœur’s 
proposition is wholly reliant on his concept of the narrative coherence 
of life. It is the narrative of one’s life which provides a structure for the 
selfhood to be realized; the subject whose aim is to live a good life in the 
world of others.8 It is mostly ‘activity’ which is constitutive of selfhood.
The foregrounding of the ‘activity’ constituent is tantamount to the 
ethical perspective of the demand of the Other. This demand implies our 
responsibility for the Other, mutual vulnerability to each other, our being 
indebted to the Other, and our being dependent on each other. While dis­
cussing the ethics of our lives, Ricœur introduces a concept of imputation 
which expresses the core of his ethical reflection. In his article Narrative 
Identity Ricœur explains this notion as follows:
Let us call ascription the assignation of an agent to an action. In this way we 
attest that the action is the possession of the one who did it, that is his or hers, that 
 6 P. Ricœur, Soi‑ meme comme un autre, Paris 1990, p. 200.
 7 Cf. J. Wall, Moral Creativity: Paul Ricœur and the Poetics of Possibility, Oxford 2005, p. 79–80.
 8 Cf. P. Ricœur, Oneself as Another, op. cit., p. 171–173.
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it belongs to one own self. Onto this act still neutral from a moral point of view, is 
grafted the act of imputation which takes on an explicitly moral signification, in the 
sense that it implies accusation, excuse or acquittal, blame or praise, or, in brief an 
estimation according to ‘the good’ or ‘the just.’9
The responsibility for my actions involves an imputation of my deeds. 
My actions can be imputed to me, and as a result my character can be 
valued according to the ethical value of my actions.10 Self­ esteem, which, 
according to Ricœur, is the ethical aim of our lives, takes on a normative 
value. We are obliged to fulfil duties we possess towards the Other. And 
from the fulfilment of the moral obligations, our bestowing of respect 
towards the Other and acting in a just way, arises a genuine formation 
of ‘the self.’ As a result, our self­ esteem is upheld and serves as a vehicle 
of an ethical interpretation of our conduct.
The Fundamental Character of Friendship in the Relation 
Between the Self and the Other
In Oneself as Another, Ricœur, proposes the ambience of friendship 
as that in which the relation between the self and the Other comes to its 
full realization. He holds that it is the terrain of friendship which demon­
strates man’s need to search for that which the self lacks. An impossibility 
of attaining that which we lack on our own necessitates the phenomenon 
of friendship. The mutual giving and sharing is for Ricœur the exact re­
sponse of the self to the Other and the Other’s response to the self. This, 
at least hypothetical, reciprocity becomes for Ricouer the fundament for 
our just ‘being’ with others: “the ‘good life’ with and for others, in just 
institutions.”11 The reciprocal exchange in friendship is for Ricouer one of 
the most fundamental ways of fulfilling the need for being with the Other.
 9 P. Ricœur, Narrative Identity, transl. M. S. Muldoon, “Philosophy Today” 35 (1991: Spring) 
issue 1, p. 75.
 10 Cf. J. Wall, Moral Creativity, op. cit., p. 87–90.
 11 P. Ricœur, Oneself as Another, op. cit., p. 172.
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The Self and the Suffering Other as the Pinnacle  
of Ricœur’s Ethics
Although, Ricœur devotes a substantial space in Oneself as Another to 
the explication of the relation of the self to the Other in terms of friend­
ship, he accentuates that the ethical relation originates in the call of the 
Other who suffers. Contrary to at least the hypothetical equality of giv­
ing and receiving, the call of the suffering Other is interwoven with the 
exertion of benevolence. Benevolence, in Ricœur’s understanding of the 
notion, arises from the fact that we are mortal human beings and thus 
vulnerable to suffering. Interestingly, Ricouer insists on the paradoxical 
power which stems from the feeling of weakness and mutual vulnerability. 
We are capable of giving in that very condition of ours which presupposes 
our human fragility, and which ultimately makes us aware of the fact that 
we are mortal.12 Ricœur bespeaks the truth about the spontaneous action 
which originates from the feeling of benevolence. Benevolence involves 
more the recognition of weakness than power. We can display benevo­
lence because we experience our dependence on others, our indebtedness 
to others; we can display benevolence since we are dependent on each 
other, prone to be harmed, to be treated unjustly. Ricœur writes: “From 
the suffering Other there comes a giving that is no longer drawn from 
the power of acting and existing, but precisely from weakness itself.”13 
In this respect, Ricœur’s rendition of the demand of the Other, the rela­
tion between the self and the Other differs, for instance, from Levinas’s 
elucidation of the relation of ‘I’ and ‘Thou,’ which the following excerpt 
from Levinas illustrates:
The Face resists possession, resists my powers. In its epiphany, inexpression, the 
sensible, still graspable, turns into resistance to the grasp. This mutation can occur 
only by the opening of a new dimension. For the resistance to the grasp is not pro­
duced as an unsurmountable resistance, like the hardness of the rock against which 
 12 Cf. P. Ricœur, Oneself as Another, op. cit., p. 192.
 13 P. Ricœur, Oneself as Another, op. cit., p. 188–189.
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the effort of the hand comes to naught, like the remoteness of a star in the immensity 
of space. The expression the face introduces into the world does not defy the feeble­
ness of my powers, but my ability for power.14
Levinas highlights the elements of power and resistance in the relation 
between the self and the Other. He expresses the enfeebled power con­
fronting the Face of the Other, whereas for Ricouer the call of the Other 
is submerged in the aspect of mutability, which constitutes the common 
ground for ‘being,’ for sharing, and for sustaining life. An encounter with 
the Other for Levinas presupposes some potential dominance of one 
over the Other, whereas in the Ricœurian understanding an encounter 
with the Other is imbued with the recognition of mutual vulnerability.
A Capable Human Being and the Notion of Imputation
Ricœur’s explication of the demand of the Other rests on the prem­
ise of a human as a capable human being. The notion of a capable man 
is for Ricœur one of the central criteria in determining the true nature 
and psychological constitution of a human being. Ricœur attempts to 
show that we can conceive of the self not an illusion, or even as a frag­
mented illusion, as it is cherished by the postmodern thinkers. Rather, 
for Ricœur, the self is the center of a capable human being, that is a be­
ing capable of acting, suffering, and speaking.15 If to be human means to 
act, to engage in the activities which are chosen freely, then responsibil­
ity for these activities bespeaks the very core of us as capable human be­
ings. In this context, Ricœur introduces the concept of imputation; the 
freely chosen activities are imputable to the self. Admittedly, Ricœur’s 
conceptualization of capability is a markedly ample one. It encompasses 
our bondage to the material world. Human capability is delimited, how­
ever, by vulnerability, by an exposition to various forms of alterity. One 
 14 E. Levinas, Totality and Infinity: an Essay on Exteriority, Dordrecht–Boston–London 1991, 
p. 197–198.
 15 Cf. J. Carter, Ricœur on Moral Religion: A Hermeneutics of Ethical Life, Oxford 2014, p. 9.
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of the fundamental capabilities is our relation to the Other, upon whom 
we are reliant and without whom we wouldn’t be able live and also we 
wouldn’t be able to understand ourselves. Our relation to the Other em­
braces moral responsibility in the face of the Other. This moral account­
ability constitutes the fundaments of our recognition of ourselves as hu­
mans. Most significantly, it is the overarching capability of responding 
to the Other which expresses our condition as humans.16
The response to the Other which ensues form the demand of the 
Other possesses an irreducible quality. It is the primordial character of 
the demand of the Other, which so much permeates our lives, that it is 
a voluntary act of our choosing to perform an activity of benevolence, 
care, love, or on the contrary: hostility, indifference, violence with all the 
minute shades of meanings and underpinnings.
Ricœur’s Concept of a ‘Good life’ as the Uttermost Ethical 
Horizon
Ricœur’s study of the relation of the self to the Other in Oneself as 
Another tackles meaningfully, as it was already mentioned, the related 
concept of a ‘good life.’ In a thorough study of the place of the notion of 
the ‘good life’ in Ricœur’s hermeneutics, Eftichis Pirovolakis underlines 
some important issues. Of major import in Ricœur’s hermeneutics, ac­
cording to Pirovolakis, is the movement between the ‘good life’ and the 
vital decisions in life, the movement which goes backwards and forwards; 
an ideal of the ‘good life’ triggers off ethical life decisions and one’s deci­
sions throughout life proceed toward the ultimately ‘good life.’ Ricouer 
sees ‘good life’ as the space providing a horizon of an unflagging inter­
pretation in three aspects: good life, self and action, self and the Other 
as interconnected.17 For Ricœur the good life which has the quality of an 
 16 Cf. Paul Ricœur: Honoring and Continuing the Work, ed. F. Erfani, New York–Toronto–
Plymouth 2011, p. 52–53.
 17 Cf. E. Pirovolakis, Reading Derrida and Ricœur: Improbable Encounters Between De con struction 
and Hermeneutics, New York 2010, p. 37.
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ideal, its content heading for an infinite and ever altering aim, calls for 
the constant flow of interpretation and reinterpretation. Crucially, the in­
terpretative process which embraces the interpretation of the meaning of 
particular actions leads to self­ interpretation and in terms of ethics the 
self­ interpretation becomes self­ esteem.18 This is constitutive of the self ’s 
ethical relation to the Other. The interpretative process unlocks a capa­
cious space for the evaluation and reevaluation of one’s deeds in the light 
of the ethical demand of the Other. Ricœur unravels the dynamic char­
acter of a ‘good life’ in which the call of the Other remains its central is­
sue. The ‘good life’ comprises ideals, and dreams of achievements, which 
in a life meet various degrees of fulfillment. For the French thinker, the 
notion of the ‘good life’ caters for the perspective from which all our ac­
tions can be viewed and to which all our actions can be directed; though 
being aims in themselves, particular actions ceaselessly subscribe to the 
overall project of a ‘good life.’ Ricœur takes cognizance of the aspect of 
finality of our deeds inscribed in the total finality of existence.19
The significant plane of the ‘good life’ in Ricœur’s elucidation of the 
relation between the self and the Other is thoroughly discussed in Ricœur 
as Another: the Ethics of Subjectivity. In this book, David Pellauer stresses 
Ricœur’s insistence on the bondage between intentionality and action; his 
view of “the self ’s ability to intend to act and to intend oneself in inscrib­
ing its actions to itself.”20 The interconnection between intentionality and 
action is constitutive of the moral structure of man with all the fragility of 
such constitution. The self is the moral subject to whom the moral deeds 
can be imputed. For Ricœur a ‘good life’ is something the self strives for 
and something to be gained. It propels the process of self­ evaluation, in 
which the self looks back at its actions and reflects on them, as well as the 
actions reflect on the self, thus shaping the person and shaping the nar­
rative identity of the subject. For Ricœur, the process of self­ evaluation 
is not something isolated or abstract; the self­ evaluation is intertwined 
 18 Cf. E. Pirovolakis, Reading Derrida…, op. cit., p. 99.
 19 Cf. P. Ricœur, Oneself as Another, op. cit., p. 179.
 20 Ricœur as Another: the Ethics of Subjectivity, eds. R. A. Cohen, J. L. Marsh, Albany 2002, p. 191.
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with the self­ evaluation of the Other. The self­ esteem is a fundamentally 
dialectic process; the evaluation is of the self and the evaluation which 
comes from the Other to the human in question.21
As for moral norms, Ricouer finds the ultimate meaning in the self ’s 
subjection to moral norms in which respecting norms arises from re­
specting others. The self­ respect gained as result of the obedience to 
moral norms, as a matter of fact, turns out to be the respect for oneself 
as another. This involves empathy and kindness. Ricœur uses here the 
term ‘solicitude.’ An accountability for one’s deeds in to be viewed in the 
context of a fragment of life, in a present situation, and also in terms of 
one’s responsibility throughout life, in life in its entirety. The demand of 
the Other, the demand of the right treatment, the call for the just conduct 
are constitutive of one’s moral identity.22 Ricœur’s concept of narrative 
identity, that is, the identity of idem and ipse, encompasses the response 
in the face of the Other in all its immediacy as well as a response which 
covers a span of time and ultimately the whole life. Ricœur insists that 
the transition from the Same to the Other implies also the reverse route – 
the transition of the Other towards the Same. An acceptance of respon­
sibility is of seminal import; it is all at once an attestation of selfhood.
‘Attestation,’ Time and the Narrative Coherence of Life
The act of accepting responsibility and the act of performing respon­
sibility become acts in which our selfhood attests to itself. One’s respon­
sibility for deeds and events lies within the circumscriptions of one’s ca­
pability and faculty of displaying control. For Ricœur, the demand of 
the Other is deeply rooted in personal identity. The dialectic character 
of identity, Ricœur’s proposal of the narrative identity, is an illuminating 
answer to the aporia enveloping personal identity. This problem can be 
formulated in the question: How do we remain the same in the passage 
of time? Ricœur’s answer unravels the most primordial interrelation of 
 21 Cf. P. Ricouer, The Just, transl. by D. Pellauer, Chicago 2003, p. 4.
 22 Cf. P. Ricouer, The Just, op. cit., p. 11–12.
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selfhood and otherness, and demonstrates meaningfully how otherness 
becomes part of selfhood. Selfhood and otherness, as two facets of iden­
tity in narrative identity, participate in the molding of ethical identity.
Admittedly, there arises the question if there is any effective possibil­
ity of uniting the prima facie exclusive sides of personal identity? In the 
chapter entitled ‘Idem’ and ‘Ipse’. From Narrative Identity to the Ethical 
Self of his Reading Derrida and Ricœur: Improbable Encounters Between 
Deconstruction and Hermeneutics, Eftichis Pirovolakis asks the question: 
“Is there any way of bridging the gulf between the plurality of narrative 
identity and the singularity of ethical selfhood?”23 He provides a clear an­
swer: it is the refiguration of the narrative unfold by the human/reader/
character which gives an opportunity to mash narrativity and responsi­
bility in ethical terms. He stresses the importance of the refigurative and 
interpretative processes which become the core of the hermeneutic pro­
cess according to one of Ricœur’s definitions of hermeneutics: “To ‘make 
one’s own’ what was previously ‘foreign’ remains the ultimate aim of all 
hermeneutics. Interpretation in its last stage wants to equalize, to ren­
der contemporaneous, to assimilate in the sense of making similar.”24 In 
this context, Ricœur answers the question regarding the common usage 
of the word of ‘self ’ instead of ‘ego,’ and thus he draws attention to the 
fact that “…all grammatical persons are subject to ascription”25 and that 
the import of moral message is conveyed in two ways, by means of two 
grammatical persons ‘I’ and ‘You.’ In particular, it is the first person ex­
pressing responsibility for one’s actions: “I did it” and the second gram­
matical person, which takes the form of commandment “You shall not 
kill.”26 Ricœur’s explanation in this respect corresponds with his propo­
sition of the narrative coherence of life which rests on the premise of the 
dialectics of idem and ipse narrative identity, as well as the dynamics of 
 23 E. Pirovolakis, Reading Derrida and Ricœur: Improbable Encounters Between Deconstruction 
and Hermeneutics, New York 2010, p. 94.
 24 P. Ricœur, Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the Surplus of Meaning, Fort Worth 1976.
 25 P. Ricœur, Narrative Identity, op. cit., p. 75.
 26 P. Ricœur, Narrative Identity, op. cit., p. 75.
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configurative, refigurative processes pertaining to the self ’s search for the 
meaning and unity of life.
Identity is identifiable while the narrative of a life unfolds and all the 
dispersed ‘stories’ comprise the ‘self ’ as a character in the narrative. If 
according to Ricœur, my identity as my ‘self ’ is to be discovered in the 
process similar to a discovery of a character in a narrative, and thus it is 
a hermeneutic process of interpretation, so does my response to the de­
mand of the other undergo a dynamic process of answering, of displaying 
responsibility not only here and now, but also horizontally, throughout 
the whole of my life. This is a response, including an impact of the nar­
ratives preceding mine, the narratives of my antecedents, and also the in­
fluence of the narratives of my contemporaries. The self is called to show 
responsibility in the face of the Other, but also in this reciprocal process 
of call and response. It is the ‘self ’ that summons the Other to respond, to 
be responsible. This reciprocal process entails the transcendence of one’s 
‘self ’; the self is capable to see oneself as the Other. And this is interwo­
ven with an exertion of a powerful result – the empathy and concern for 
the Other. The benevolent gesture of hospitality opens a viable possibil­
ity of seeing the wellbeing of Other as one’s own good, as the response is 
saturated with attentiveness and kindness towards the Other for whom 
I am responsible. Ricœur’s ethics tackles the idea of time in relation to 
the demand of the Other – not only in the context of the time of one’s 
life, but also in the context of the ethical demand of the Other and time 
understood in terms of the changes in the ethical evaluation which the 
passage of historical time may impose. What can be viewed as an ethical 
quandary at present and the realization that it must be resolved may be 
contrasted with a total obliviousness to the same issue in ethical terms 
maintained at a different point in history.27
The demand of the Other becomes not only the demand of an instan­
taneous action or a gesture but it is part of prudence. This far­ sightedness 
of the relation between ‘I’ and the Other takes cognizance of the self ’s 
inner capabilities of foreseeing the results of one’s actions in the sort and 
 27 Cf. P. Ricouer, The Just, op. cit., p. 148.
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the long run, however, the results cannot be envisaged fully. In this re­
spect, Ricœur’s rendition of the call of the Other reminds of Gadamer’s 
elucidation of a true hermeneutic conversation: “The unpredictability of 
a true conversation lies in allowing oneself ‘to be conducted by the sub­
ject matter.’”28 The relation between the self and the Other is not an un­
requited, unilateral bond, but it is a relation which necessitates reciproc­
ity, carefulness and discretion. The demand of the Other transgresses the 
barrier of a difference in ‘Weltanschauung;’ as a matter of fact, the de­
mand of the Other and the genuine response to the Other cross the po­
tential ideological, religious, personal obstacles, as both the demand of 
the Other and response are always in search for an effective understand­
ing, an understanding which is in Ricœur’s and Gadamer’s philosophi­
cal hermeneutics the most fundamental mode of being­ in­ the­ world.29
Ricœur views the answer to the Other as anticipated by the demand 
of the Other. The Other summons me to respond, and my response hap­
pens as a reciprocal event/occurrence or process. The mutual vulnerabil­
ity of the self and the Other, the sense of indebtedness and responsibility 
entangle reciprocity. In this respect, Ricœur represents a different view 
from Emmanuel Levinas’s proposal of the relation between the self and 
the Other. Levinas writes:
I am responsible for the Other without waiting for reciprocity, were I to die for it. 
Reciprocity is his affair. It is precisely insofar as the relation between the Other and me 
is not reciprocal that I am subjection to the Other; and I am ‘subject’ essentially in this 
sense. It is I who support all. The I always has one responsibility more than the others.30
Contrary to Levinas’s proposal, Ricœur’s conceptualization of the de­
mand of the Other includes a presupposition of the response to and of 
 28 H.­G. Gadamer, Philosophical Hermeneutics, transl. & ed. D. E. Linge, Berkely–Los Angeles 
1977, p. 66.
 29 Cf. Gadamer and Ricœur: Critical Horizons for Contemporary Hermeneutics, eds. F. J. Mootz III, 
G. H. Taylor, London–New York 2011, p. 1–2.
 30 E. Levinas, Ethics and Infinity, Conversations with Philippe Nemo, transl. Richard A. Cohen, 
Pittsburgh, PA 1985, p. 99.
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the Other. An extensive explication of the differences between Ricœur’s 
and Levinas’s approaches to alterity and the demand of the Other, as well 
as remarks on Ricœur’s critique of Levinas, can be found in Ricœur as 
Another: the Ethics of Subjectivity. The central argument of Richard Cohen, 
a Levinas scholar, presented in the book, is his claim of Ricœur’s misun­
derstanding of Levinas’s illumination of the alterity and the passivity of 
the ‘self ’ responding to alterity.31 We, however, do not endorse the claim 
of misunderstanding, but rather see Ricœur’s and Levinas’s approaches as 
inasmuch differing as complimentary. The underlying difference in un­
derstanding alterity, the relation between ‘I’ and ‘Thou’ for Ricœur and 
Levinas rests on the their attitude to mutuality. For Ricœur the demand 
of the Other presupposes not only an inevitability, but crucially, the mu­
tuality of response. Essentially, for Levinas it is a sense of distance, or an 
absence of the Other’s countenance expressed in the encounter between 
‘I’ and ‘Thou.’ For the Jewish philosopher, the Other presents himself/
herself through face, which is the metaphor for the non­ alergic relation. 
Levinas’s model of the ‘I’ and ‘Thou’ relation relies on language, which 
presupposes the room for diversity; the desire of the Other is a desire 
to act with him/her, and it cannot be satiated, as it does not seek to fill 
a void or a negation. In Totality and Infinity, Levinas presents the Other­ 
oriented way of thought, which fundamentally implies readiness to lis­
ten; there is no escape from finding oneself in the world of the alien, the 
confrontation happens through and in the dynamics of language.32 For 
Levinas one’s responsibility for the Other does not involve reciprocity. 
Ricœur insists on the mutability of vulnerability, the mutuality of re­
sponse and of responsibility.
The Just, Practical Wisdom and the Linguistic Aspect
Ricœur views an ethical life as the proper fundamental premise for the 
problem of justice and all the related questions especially the universality 
 31 Cf. Ricœur as Another: The Ethics of Subjectivity, op. cit., p. 127–133.
 32 Cf. E. Levinas, Totality and Infinity, Pittsburgh 1969, p. 50–53.
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of norms. In this respect Ricœur recurs to the notion of practical wis­
dom which is deployed as the overarching frame for the questions un­
der the umbrella term of justice and the applicability of ethical norms33 
Significantly, the exploration of ethical identity in Ricœur’s hermeneutics 
concerns a whole set of binary opposed pairs: self and the Other, univer­
sal norm versus particular tradition, ‘is’ and ‘ought.’ In an explanation 
of the ethical identity, Ricœur maintains the primary character of ethics 
over morality. For him it is crucial that the ethical aim needs to be tested 
by morality, as well as in cases of norms producing conflicts there is the 
requirement of a resort to the teleological aim.34
The demand of the Other and the genuine response to the demand 
of the Other in Ricœur’s hermeneutics rests on the fundamental ques­
tion he asks himself, the question which is disregarded by the postmod­
ern thinkers; it is the query of ‘who I am?’. The answer to the question 
is not only problematic in terms of philosophy, with an entire history of 
philosophy as backdrop, the answer is basically reliant on the delimita­
tions of language as Adriana Cavarero notices following Hannah Arendt: 
“Philosophical discourse… is unable to determine in words the individual 
uniqueness of a human being. As far as philosophy is concerned, Arendt 
remarks ‘who’ someone is, in all of his or her singularity, ‘retains a curi­
ous intangibility that confounds all efforts towards unequivocal verbal 
expression,’ Put it another way, ‘the moment we want to say who some­
one is, our very vocabulary leads us astray and into saying what he is.’”35 
In respect of language Arendt’s proposition is concordant with the con­
structedness of human subjectivity endorsed by the postmodern philoso­
phies; the human subject constructed and determined by social, sexual, 
psychic, or linguistic mechanisms. Any kind of discourse, be it the philo­
sophical one is delimited by language constraints. Showing his acknowl­
edgement of language insufficiencies, Ricœur does not, however, anchor 
an answer to the query of ‘who am I?’ in language only, or does not see it 
 33 Cf. E. Levinas, Totality and Infinity, op. cit., p. 194–197.
 34 Cf. P. Ricœur, Oneself as Another, op. cit., p. 169–173.
 35 A. Cavarero, Relating Narratives: Storytelling and Selfhood, London–New York 2000, p. 7.
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as narrowed to the matter of language. His answer to this question is to 
be found in his hermeneutics of the self which stretches beyond the cir­
cumscriptions of language. Hermeneutics is not only a mode of know­
ing but a way of being and in that it reaches in the profoundest way the 
ontology of being, in its pre­ linguistic phase.
The Demand of the Other, Hermeneutics of the Self,  
and Life as the Story in the Search of Meaning
Ricœur’s explication of the demand of the Other is intertwined with 
the two other major concerns of his hermeneutics: the search for an an­
swer to the question of ‘who am I?’ and the quest for the meaning of life. 
The question of ‘who am I?’ is not an isolated query, and it is also not one 
among other significant ones, but more, it is a question, which when an­
swered grants the self with the fulfillment of an innermost desire; to know 
who one is means to understand, to undergo a process of interpretation 
which releases an answer. For Ricœur, the process of interpretation, which 
generates an answer in always interlinked with the self ’s response to the de­
mand of the Other. For the French philosopher, there seems to be no other 
way for the self to unveil and comprehend the truth about ‘who I am’ than 
to get engaged in the process of mutual responsivity and responsibility for 
the Other. The demand of the Other and my response have a mediating 
quality. It is through the demand of the Other that the story of my life be­
comes a story in the search of meaning, as the totality of my entanglement 
in the narratives of others causes that I genuinely discover my identity. 
The narrative of my life becomes a part of the narrative of the Other, and 
his/hers becomes a part of mine. The demand of the Other is substantial­
ly, significantly, even surprisingly, or unwillingly constitutive of the story 
of my life and concomitantly it is constitutive of my self, of my identity.
The Final Remarks
To conclude, it must be stressed that Paul Ricœur’s proposition of 
ethics, and his rendition of the demand of the Other, discussed here 
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mainly on the basis of his ground­ breaking Oneself as Another, is inex­
tricably interwoven with the major preoccupation of his hermeneutics 
of the self, which is the quest for the meaning of life, and the search of 
an answer to the question of ‘who I am?’ Ricœur’s construal of the rela­
tion between the self and the Other, which refers mostly to the self and 
the suffering Other, the articulation of the workings of friendship, the 
capable human and the explanation of the notion of ‘good life’ as the te­
leological horizon of a life comprise the fundaments of his prioritizing 
of ethics over morality. For Ricœur the demand of the Other is set on 
the premise of understanding viewed as a rudimentary mode of being­ 
in­ the world. The plane of the ethics of the Other is saturated with the 
discourse of our proneness to being affected by the Other, the mutual 
vulnerability, indebtedness to the Other and reliance on the Other, with 
all the lingual limitations of expression. The genuine response to the de­
mand of the Other equals a worthy, fulfilled life, reflected, for Ricœur, 
in the narrative coherence of a life. The narrative coherence of life, for 
Ricœur, is the only viable possibility of finding an answer to the ques­
tion of ‘who am I?’. The subject uncovers his/her identity in a life­ long 
process. It is not a univocal, unadulterated story of one’s life, a superfi­
cial, linear account of the life events, which provides an answer to the 
fundamental query of ‘who am I?’, but rather, as Ricœur argues, it is all 
the various stories which ask for recognition and interpretation which 
comprise an answer to the question underlying human existence. The 
narrative coherence of a life bestows the human subject with a genuine 
possibility of unveiling a response to the otherwise unanswerable ques­
tion of human subjectivity.
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Abstract
The Demand of the Other in Paul Ricœur’s Philosophical 
Hermeneutics
The article proposes to view Paul Ricœur’s ethics and the demand of the Other from 
the perspectives that are mostly explicated in his seminal Oneself as Another, namely: 
the self and the suffering Other, friendship, the capable human being, and the notion of 
‘the good life’ seen as the teleological horizon of a human life. My attempt is to demon­
strate that for Ricœur the demand of the Other is set on the premise of understanding 
viewed as the fundamental mode of being­ in­ the world, and that his ethics of the Other 
comprises mainly such phenomena as mutual vulnerability, the self ’s indebtedness to the 
Other and reliance on the Other, as well as an expression of the feelings of benevolence 
and solicitude. Significantly, for Ricouer the genuine response to the demand of the Other 
equals a worthy, fulfilled life manifested in the narrative coherence of a life. This article 
also touches upon the debate between Ricœur and Lévinas regarding the ‘I’ and ‘Thou’ 
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relation and the underlying difference in their approach to alterity; Ricœur’s presupposi­
tion of the response of the Other and Levinas’s model which does not entangle reciprocity.
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Ricœur, the demand of Other, ethics, vulnerability
Abstrakt
Nakaz Drugiego w hermeneutyce filozoficznej Paula Ricœura
W artykule proponuję spojrzenie na etykę Paula Ricœura i nakaz Drugiego pod ką­
tem treści poruszanych w jego dziele O sobie samym jako innym, takich jak: „ja” i Drugi, 
który cierpi, przyjaźń, „dobre życie” rozumiane jako teleologiczny horyzont ludzkiej 
egzystencji. Moim celem jest ukazanie, że Ricœur sytuuje nakaz Drugiego w „rozu­
mieniu”, które jest pojmowane jako fundamentalny sposób bycia ­w ­świecie. Etyka 
Ricœura obejmuje przede wszystkim zagadnienie podatności na zranienie, wzajemną 
odpowiedzialność, dobroć i troskliwość. Ricœur twierdzi, że prawdziwa odpowiedź 
na nakaz Drugiego równa się wartościowemu, spełnionemu życiu i wyraża się w jego 
narracyjnej spójności. Artykuł podejmuje również temat debaty pomiędzy Ricœurem 
i Levinasem wokół relacji „ja” i „ty”, i różnic w podejściu do niej: model Ricœura za­
kłada odpowiedź Drugiego, podczas gdy Levinas mówi o relacji, która nie musi być 
oparta na wzajemności.
Słowa kluczowe
Ricœur, nakaz Drugiego, etyka, podatność na zranienie
